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1. INTRODUCTION
The title of Marc Champagne’s paper includes the phrase Analytic Philosophy’s
Arrogation of Argument. Indeed, a main issue, if not the main issue, discussed in the
paper is the alleged claim by analytic philosophers “that what sets their camp apart from
long-time rivals is a shared adherence to ‘proper’ norms of argumentation” (p. 2). I
believe the only named “long-time rivals” are “continental” philosophers. So what are the
alleged proper norms of argumentation that analytic philosophy has but continental
philosophy lacks? Champagne identifies many features that are presented as
distinguishing these two camps, but only some of these can with any plausibility be seen
as representing norms of argumentation. That is my principal criticism of the paper—it
seems too wide-ranging. It gives a worthwhile discussion of differences between the
analytic and continental schools, but the different norms identified are not
paradigmatically norms of argument. A better case can be made that some are norms of
argumentation.
2. ANALYTIC VS. CONTINENTAL
Some of the supposedly distinguishing features appear to be nonstarters insofar as they
merely delineate what it is to be an approach, camp, or school. In discussing how Thomas
Kuhn’s insights were differently appropriated, Champagne indicates that “the analytic
world” was impressed with the idea that “dogmatism and willful intellectual closure can
actually improve the overall institutional strength of a discipline” (p. 5). But surely this is
just a bit of (slightly Machiavellian) political wisdom that applies to any discipline or
movement. Another example is Champagne’s fictitious entry for “juxtaposition” in a
philosophical dictionary. Rather than illustrating the “gratuitous combination of arbitrary
notions and exploration of ensuing myriad interrelations” (p. 7), the case seems to be
better understood as illustrating ever increasing refinement of positions on an issue,
something that could happen in any movement. Think of libertarianism and hard and soft
determinism, and their variants, for example.
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Some of the distinguishing features have to do with the content of analytic and
continental philosophy rather than with its argumentative form, and therefore are also
nonstarters. Champagne indicates that analytic philosophy is characterized by the
“piecemeal clarification of linguistic confusions” (p. 5) or (quoting Michael Friedman)
“an obsession with specific technical problems in the logical or linguistic analysis of
language,” which are of interest only to “a small circle of narrow specialists” (p. 1). This
focus is held to be generally to the exclusion of considering the big problems of
philosophy, the ones that draw ordinary people to philosophy in the first place, such as
the nature of reality or the meaning of life. These are generally left to the purview of
continental philosophers (p. 1).
The candidate distinguishing features that remain, so far as I can see, are as
follows:
Analytic philosophy is characterized by
(1) “clarity of method” (p. 1)
(2) being “scientifically minded” (p. 1)
(3) “a sustained uniformity in the vocabulary employed” (p. 4)
(4) “cooperative cumulative progress in the formulation and assimilation of
‘results’” (pp. 1, 4)
(5) “moving forward” but by “quite humble” increments (p. 4)
(6) discipline “professionalization” (p. 4)

Continental philosophy is characterized by
(7) “almost willful obscurity more characteristic of a poetic use of language than
of ostensibly logical argumentative discourse” (p. 1)
(8) “literary intellectuality” (p. 1)
(9) “sophistry” (p. 2)
(10) claims made “not by axioms, definitions, and syllogisms, but by means of
imagery” (p. 3)
(11) including “barriers of jargon, convolution, and metaphor” (p. 3)
Of course more of the putative features of continental philosophy are phrased from a
(pretty derogatory) analytic point of view than are the putative analytic features phrased
from a continental point of view. (About this tendency, Glock says “just as theists should
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not be allowed to define God into existence, analytical philosophers should not be
allowed to define themselves into excellence” (2008, p. 211.)) Otherwise, for the most
part, I have no particular quibble with the accuracy of these attributions. My main
questions are: Do these features represent norms of argumentation? Do they represent
norms of argument?
Many of the features seem to be better described as representing general
prescriptions of intellectual methodology that need not have anything to do with
argument per se since they apply to any sort of discourse within the discipline. Consider
(1) and (2), which, recast as norms, amount to be clear and be scientific. Presumably, one
can and should obey—even when one is not reasoning toward a conclusion. This can be
said as well about the remaining characterizations of analytic philosophy, except perhaps
(6), which seems to represent neither a general methodological prescription nor an
argumentative norm.
Regarding the characterizations of continental philosophy, consider the
prescription(s) that (7) and (10) represent, viz., ‘avoid ostensibly logical argumentative
discourse’ or ‘avoid axioms, definitions, and syllogisms’. Where ‘argumentation’ is
understood as concerning the presentation of argument or the action or process of
arguing, this prescription surely should count as at least a norm of argumentation. It
seems to basically say ‘avoid formalization in the presentation of your argument’. And
indeed, one is unlikely to see arguments being formalized in continental philosophy (I
never have). Not only does formalization of argument appear to be disvalued, the study of
formalization or symbolic logic is not a subfield of continental philosophy. Of course the
situation is largely the opposite in analytic philosophy, so this case does appear to
constitute a genuine and important norm of argumentation with respect to which
continental and analytic philosophy differ.
This perhaps interprets the prescription represented by (10) ‘avoid axioms,
definitions, and syllogisms’, somewhat charitably. I take it that it is not prescribing the
avoidance of syllogistic reasoning or reasoning from first principles in one’s thinking. I
hope we all agree that that would be impossible insofar as these are constitutive of what it
is to reason at all. Rather, I take it that what is being prescribed is the avoidance of
spelling out the elements of reasoning in an explicit stepwise, and often symbolic,
fashion.
The other elements of the continental list (with one exception), like the analytic
list, seem to represent general prescriptions of intellectual methodology that need not
have anything to do with argument per se since they apply to any sort of discourse within
the discipline. Consider, for example, (7)’s ‘be obscure’, which one can do whether one is
reasoning or not.
There is, however, the norm of being sophistical represented by (9), which in a
general sense seems to say that it is all right or desirable to engage in fallacious but
plausible reasoning. Clearly, this has to do with argument, and not just argumentation.
But is it a norm of argument? It seems that paradigmatically, norms of argument are far
more specific; indeed, there seems to be a one-to-one correspondence between, on the
one hand, positive and negative norms of argument, and on the other hand, valid and
invalid or (more broadly) cogent and fallacious argument patterns. For example, a
positive norm of argument would be that denying the consequent or Modus Tollens is a
permissible pattern of reasoning, and a negative norm of argument would be that it is
3
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impermissible to infer that the whole has all of the properties of the parts. If this is right,
the prescription represented by (9)—be sophistical—is better understood as a meta norm
of argument or as a statement on the level of generality or vagueness as the claim that
analytic philosophy has ‘arrogated argument’ or “that what sets their camp apart from
long-time rivals is a shared adherence to ‘proper’ norms of argumentation.” I conclude,
then, that Champagne has not given us a single clear case of a norm of argument with
respect to which continental and analytic philosophy differ.
Nevertheless, the prescription be sophistical is very suggestive. It does seem that
not infrequently analytic philosophers charge continental philosophers with mounting
arguments that are sophistical in a particular way, and sometimes a defense is mounted
that although the particular approach may differ from usual analytic norms, it is not
fallacious. This applies almost exclusively to nondeductive reasoning patterns. Perhaps
the best known case of this is the charge that Nietzsche commits the genetic fallacy in
some of his writings on ethics, most notably his book, The Genealogy of Morals. A
definition of the genetic fallacy is reasoning that an idea is objectionable
(unobjectionable) on the grounds that it has objectionable (unobjectionable) origins. The
Genealogy of Morals might be summarized as a detailed defense of the claim that
altruistic values are to be disvalued because of the tainted historical and psychological
circumstances out of which they grew. As a response to this charge, some defenders of
Nietzsche predictably argue that he does not quite make the inferential leaps necessary to
commit the fallacy; with respect to moral or altruistic values, they say his book was
meant only to “prepare the way for their critique” (Loeb 2008, pp. 9–10). Other defenders
of Nietzsche take the bull by the horns and argue that no fallacy is committed: Nietzsche
is adopting and applying an aristocratic or noble standard according to which
questions of value or legitimacy are always decided by an inquiry into family pedigree, lineage, or
heredity […] Having discovered their ignoble origins, he concludes that altruistic values are “bad”
in the aristocratic sense—that is base, pitiable and contemptible […] Nietzsche [thereby] finds in
the genealogical aspect of moral values a relatively given, essential, universal, invariant, and
unitary determinant of their value. (Loeb 2008, pp. 2, 3, 14)

3. CONCLUSION
Champagne purports to discuss analytic philosophy’s arrogation of argument from
continental philosophy. But of the many features that he discusses as distinguishing these
two approaches, only one clearly represents a norm of argumentation (‘avoid
formalization’) and none clearly represent norms of argument. However, one feature,
“sophistry,” is suggestive of norms of argument with respect to which continental and
analytic philosophy may actually differ.
Link to reply
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